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## Where Do We Go in Intelligence?

In the first heat of the Cuban failure President Kennedy appointed a commission headed by the retired Army chief of staff, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, to examine paramilitary activities, including intelligence and guerrilla tactics. Others on the commission are Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; the chief of naval operations, Admiral Burke; and Attorney General Kennedy.

The timing, the circumstances, and some additional evidence of importance made it clear that this commission would examine and report on at least the lessons of the Cuban expedition. Although it was not designated as a commission to investigate a failure, it could hardly avoid paying much attention to the failure, including the information, or intelligence, on which it was based.

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This commission was asked to report in June. Apparently it will have no further life.

To the extent that this commission is examining intelligence, it is examining the work of the agency Mr. Dulles directs. To the extent it is examining paramilitary affairs involving the Navy, it is examining the institution over which Admiral Burke presides. Both are among the examiners. But both have important responsibilities in further developments, including improvements, in paramilitary activities.

This commission did not satisfy the considerable element in Congress, and in the country, that sees dangers in the present independ-

ence of the CIA. About that agency such elementary facts as its annual appropriations and the number of its employees remain hidden. There are moves in Congress now to set up congressional watch-dog committees.

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So there were in late 1955 and early 1956. In January of 1956 President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. It was headed by President James R. Killian, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and consisted of seven other well known men, including retired Admiral Connolly and retired General Hull, and including also Joseph P. Kennedy, father of the President. It was to meet at least once in every six months and to report to the President on the quality of foreign intelligence provided to the executive branch of the government, including the performance of the CIA.

The history of this board is difficult to trace. If it brought changes, they did not reach public attention. In Congress it was commonly regarded as a device for heading off a sharper congressional committee. Yet it had good men on it.

Now President Kennedy has set up what is called a broadened edition of this body, now named the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. It will operate on a continuing basis, will cover the whole field of intelligence, and will have authority to call for any information the CIA possesses, and all

other intelligence agencies, of which there are several.

Once again Dr. Killian is to preside over this work. Once again retired General Doolittle and Dr. William O. Baker of the Bell Telephone Laboratories are members (as are some other eminents), and once again Congress is saying that this is the move to head off a congressional committee. Whether the new board will back Congress is not yet clear.

What is clear is that Congress—and we suspect the country—is not satisfied with what it knows about the CIA and all others who participated in giving the Cuba expedition the go-ahead, and therefore is increasingly disturbed about the effectiveness and the military judgment in future activities. There are strong objections against throwing open some intelligence activities to public gaze. But there are also strong doubts about the great unknowns of the CIA and, so far as the Cuban business is concerned, about the military mistakes.

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If the new Killian committee can and will really do a job, it can lessen much of the doubt. But it ought to try in some way to convince the country (not to speak of Congress) that it is bringing improvement and heading off big mistakes. That is difficult to do when so much of the operating area is surrounded by secrecy, the natural generator of doubt and suspicion. But it is essential. Without it nothing is possible that will satisfy Congress and the country.